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Television news is undoubtedly one of the major sources 
of news and information for many Americans. Recent trends 
in the television news industry all indicate that television 
will continue to be such a major source of news in the years 
to come. One such trend has been the lengthening by some 
stations of their local newscasts, ·with many more stations 
co~templating such a move. Network television also is con-
sidering the lengthening of its newscasts and is enjoying 
the rising popularity of its "news magazines" such as CBS's 
"60 Minutes". 
Many researchers have examined the role of television 
as a major source of news, and some have studied the impact 
of television news on society. Still others have concen-
trated on detailed analysis of television news coverage 
of significant events. The present study is designed to 
expand on · this existing knowledge by observi~g and analyzing 
network television news coverage of a significant and recent 
international event, namely the Iranian hostage crisis (1979-
19 81) . 
The Iranian hostage crisis, which dominated the inter-
national scene for over a year, began on November 4, 1979, 
when several hundred Iranian "militant students" attacked 
' ' ' 
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the American Embassy in Tehran, Iran, taking sixty-six pe r-
sonnel and nonpersonnel 0ostage. The militants, who were 
later supported by the Iranian revolutionary government, 
primarily demanded the return of the former Shah of Iran 
(Mohamad Reza Pahlavi), to be tried for alleged crimes and 
corruptions committed during his thirty-seven years of 
ruling Iran. The Shah had been admitted to a New York hos-
pital for "medical treatment" several days prior to the date 
the hostages were taken. Several captives were released 
during the first few days of the crisis, whereas the last 
fifty-two Americans were freed from ·Iran, after 444 days in 
captivity, on January 20, 1981, moments after Ronald Reagan 
had been sworn in as the fortieth president of the United 
States. 
Background and Related Material 
In order to study television news coverage (of foreign 
events), one has to examine several aspects of television 
news. The following questions are posed and an attempt will 
be made to deal with each in this chapter: 
1. How much does the American public rely on televi-
sion for news? 
2. Can television news influence the public? 
3. Can the American government influence television 
news? 
4. How has television news performed in the covering 
pf past foreign events? 
5. Has television news been objective or free of bias 
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in the past? 
1. How much does the American public rely on tele-
vision for news? A great deal. It is estimated that every 
we eknight some 25 to 30 million American households, that 
is approximately 65 to 70 million people, watch ~ne of the 
three network television news programs (Altheide, 1976; 
. . 
Pearce, 1980). According to a report by Television Informa-
tion Office (Roper, 1980), a sizeable majority of the Amer-
ican public continues to get most of its news from tele-
vision (64% as of November 1976) which has led all media 
since 1963. Roper further found that, since 1961, televi-
sian has led · as the most believable news medium in the eyes 
of the American public. 
In terms of overall television viewing (in which news 
is included) Reel (1979) points out that adults spend ap-
proximately 28% of their leisure time watching TV, and that 
sixty million sets are on for an average of six hours a day. 
Reel speculates that by the time a child reaches school, 
he will have watched television for more hours than he will 
ever spend in college classrooms. Reel further indicates 
that by the time the child is e~ghteen, he will have devoted 
one-sixth · of his life to television viewing. 
Thus, one may conclude that the American public is fond 
of television and tends to rely heavily on it for news. 
2. Can television news influence the public? Schil-
ler (1973 ) believes this is so and explains: 
America's media managers create, process, refine, and 
preside over the circulation of images and information 
which determine our beliefs and attitudes and, ulti-
mately, our behavior. When they deliberately produce 
messages that do not correspond to the realities of 
social existence, the media managers become mind man-
agers. ( p. 1) 
Although Schiller is referring to mass media in general, the 
assumption could be made that he has television in mind as 
well. 
Further argument for television news influence on the 
public comes from Reel (1979): 
The real problem posed by network control over the 
broadcasting of the news ... is not avarice. It is the 
power, the potential to influence people's minds and 
actions, that is most troublesome. It is a disturbing 
fact that today most Americans do not read newspapers $ 
Sixty percent of all Americans .depend solely on tele-
vision for their news. (pp. 92-93) 
Some authors/researchers have used specific examples 
to explain how television news can influence the public 
opinion. For example, Kuhns (1970), regarding the 1968 
Chicago convention, writes: 
Indeed the very extent of aggravation and ho.stility 
that the televi~ion netwo~ks aroused proves, as much 
as the moon landing a year later, the fantastic power 
and influence of the medium. (p. 49) 
One cannot discuss the infltience of television ·news 
on the public without mentioning the television coverage of 
President John F. Kennedy's assassination in 1963. In a 
· · , boo~ on this subject, Mayo (1967) wr~tes: 
The continuous newscast o~ the assassination and fun-
eral of . President John F. Kennedy and the . succession 
to the presidency by Lyndon B. ·Johnson, was an un-
prece4ented psy9hological, political and journalistic 
event. ( p. 5) 
Mayo further indicates that "television gave the griev-
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ing nation a comforting sense of continuity and of national 
survival" (p. 5). Greenberg and Parker (1965) make similar 
observations and note that: 
The communication channels reassured people that the 
functions of government were being carried on smoothly, 
that there was no conspiracy, and that there was no 
further threat. If the content of the consequent com-
munication had not been so reassuring, fear and anxiety 
might have magnified to the point of hysteria. (p. 382) 
It appears that mass media, especially television, 
played a very important role of reassuring the public. It 
is perhaps ironic that television news gave one of its finest 
and most influential performances while covering the death 
of a president. 
Zucker (1978) studied the influence of network tele-
vision news on public opinion in the areas of pollution, 
drug abuse, energy, unemployment, and the cost of living in 
the period of 1968 to 1976. The author found that network 
television news reports had altered the viewers' perception 
in the areas of pollution, drug abuse and energy. 
In another example of influence of television news 
(this time on the policy of the U.S government regarding the 
Vietnam War) Shaw (1979) explains how Walter Cronkite be-
came opposed to the war and this prompted President Johnson 
to tell his press secretary that it was a turning point, 
that if he had l ost Walter, he had lost Mr. Average Citizen. 
Shaw further quotes author David Halberstam as saying, "It 
was the first time · in American history a war had been de-
clared over by an anchorman " ( p. 42). 
In order to broaden the perspective, it is perhaps 
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helpful to note the thoughts of a Soviet journali s t on the 
Republican National Convention of 1980: 
It was a perfect television show. In fact, it was 
for television that the convention was primarily in-
tended. This may seem an exaggeration, but the three 
giant TV networks--which determine not only public 
opinion in America but also, to a large extent, the 
country's policy--did more than produce a gigantic show. 
They essentially directed the convention. (Kobysh, 
1980, p. 57) 
There are of course different ways in which television 
news can influence public opinion. One way is by prolonging 
the coverage of a specific issue. This is perhaps due to 
the fact that one of the most important factors affecting 
recall has been found to be the length of time a story ap-
pears on the air (Stauffer, Frost and Rybolt, 1978). This 
has also been indicated by McClure and Patterson (1976) who 
reported cases in which television news, through intensive 
coverage, played a role in increasing the salience of issues 
on the audience's mind (like coverage of Nixon's trip to 
China in 1972). 
Another way television news can exert its influence is 
by manipulating masses and by propagandizing. Addressing 
mass media in general, Cirino (1971) · writes: 
Even though it appears obvious that the ·use of prop-
aganda has considerable effect on public attitudes 
and behavior, the owners of media are still able to 
minimize its importance because it is extremely dif-
ficult to prove scientifically the exact effect of 
attempts to influence public opinion. (p. 184) 
Cirino further argues that, in the broadest sense, "All 
the people of the world are in a state of being propagan-
dized by the very technical and financial nature of modern 
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communication" (p. 200). 
Another attempt to explain the manipulative power of 
mass media was made by Wells (1972): 
Since the media are invariably · controlled by a small 
group of people, be they government personnel or pri-
vate operators, they always have a manipulative poten-
tial. Indeed, by the necessary selection of informa-
tion to be transmitted, no matter how carefully this 
selection is made, there is always a slant given to 
the reportage of human events. So the problem of man-
ipulation is a matter of degree. (pp. 73-74) 
Recently, in 1979, Reel discussed the problem in an-
other form: 
The potential for manipulation and control of public 
opinion that now exists in the offices of American net-
works is without question, beyond any preexisting pri-
vate power in our history. (p. 93) 
In summation, it appears that television news is be-
lieved to have the potential to influence public opinion 
and may be used to manipulate the masses. 
3. Can the American government influence television 
news reporting? The question of government influence on 
television news has always haunted the television industry. 
It is significant to note that in many other countries of 
the world, television and other major media are controlled 
by their respective governments. This, however, is not the 
case in the United States, even though the FCC has regulatory 
power over the broadcast industry. This section first deals 
with the nonregulatory influence of government on television 
news and then discussion will be afforded to ·the regulatory 
power of the government over television news. 
Lowry (1971) studied the possibility of the administra-
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tion influencing the network television news. Through a 
content analysis, the author found the three networks' 
news reporting had been influenced by the administration (of 
President Nixon). 
Skornia (1968) discusses the kind of influence, on 
media in general, which is brought by censorship: 
There is, no doubt, too much government censorship, 
particularly by the military. Any such censorship is 
too much in peacetime. · All journalists should oppose 
managed news, and should fight for access to all mat-
erials which do not genuinely jeopardize our national 
security. (p. 82) 
In an article discussing how the members of Congress 
can benefit from the news media, Ba~dikian (1974) writes: 
Most of the media are willing conduits for the highly 
selective information the member of Congress decides 
to feed the electorate. This propaganda is sent to 
newspapers and broadcasting stations, and the vast 
majority of them pass it off to the voters as profes-
sionally collected, written and edited "news". (p. 4) 
In an article discussing the manner in which President 
Carter tried to shape the news, Leubsdorf (1978) explains 
that the president made an announcement of a $100 million 
pledge for solar energy on Sun Day, shortly before the dead-
line for the networks' evening news. Since the networks did 
not have enough time to check t0e details, they went ahead 
with the story of the pledge; only to find later that the 
pledge had not really been new and had been a part of a 
package already in the making. Leubsdorf suggests: 
What had happened was an exc~llent example of the abil-
ity of any U.S president to "make news" and control the 
way it is disseminated. It is a problem most White 
House correspondents recognize, but one which they often 
feel virtually helpless to deal with, especially when 
the events happen close to deadline. (p. 42) 
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The story was, of course, later corrected but it was 
too lat e and it had already made the impact the pre side nt 
had s ought. Leubsdorf explains how: 
While a number of these stories provided at least s ome 
context for the pledge story, most of the nation's 
vi e we r s and readers never got to the fine print, e s -
pe cially since most, presumably, perceived the even t 
as it wa s presented by the three networks and the two 
major wire services. The net impact was precisely the 
one the White House intended: A belief . that the pres-
ident h ad made an important new commitment to solar 
energy on Sun Day. And the incident demonstrated once 
more the tremendous advantage any White House has over 
the presidential press corps. (p. 43) 
Finally, Reel (1 979) tells a story of television news 
indus try's sensitivity to government reaction: 
Pe rhaps the most dramatic example of the television 
industry's sensitivity to government reaction occurred 
while Lyndon Johnson was president. Johnson had had a 
s peech prepared by his assistant, Joseph Califano, in 
which the term public airwaves had appeared. President 
Johnson penciled in 's after the word public, so that 
it now read "public'sairwaves". The next day Califano 
was besiege d by all the major broadcast lobbyists, who 
wanted to know whether this change signified some dan-
gerous new anti-industry policy in the executive office. 
(p. 102) 
Although the nonregulatory influence of government has 
been greatly debated, the regulatory power of government has 
been debated just as much, if not more. The basic law which 
gives the .government its authority of control over broad-
casting is the Communications Act of 1934. The Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC) is the government agency charged 
with watching over the broadcasters. 
Of the provisional regulations that relate to the tele-
vision news, the Fairness Doctrine and the equal time pro-
vision of Section 315 of the Communications Act are most 
.. ' 
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debated. The Fairness Doctrine applies to the broadcasters' 
obligation to be balanced and fair in their news coverage 
and public affair programming. The equal time provision, 
however, applies specifically to the treatment of political 
candidates and to the broadGasters' obligations to make time 
available to all qualified candidates . (Diamond, 1978). 
The Fairness Doctrine and the equal time provision have 
brought negative reactions from the broadcasters and the 
professionals in the field. One such reaction comes from 
Hofstetter and Buss (1978) who note tha~: 
The Fairness Doctrine, for instance, requires mention 
of more than one view concerning issues. Depth in cov-
erage may be sacrificed by giving several groups time 
or space with regard to some issue. Resulting super-
ficial coverage provides less information even if the 
in-depth coverage were less balanced. (p. 525) 
Schoenbrun (1976), a long-time media professional, has 
the following thought: 
The question of equal time has made stations so ner-
vous that they are fearful about giving time to any 
candidate. But that is not the worst of it. Over the 
years the equal time provision has grown and spread 
like a cancer throughout the entire American media. 
(p. 78) 
Criticism comes also from Congressional Representative 
VanDeerlih (1977) who observed that "Existing communications 
law is far more a hindrance than help to the news profes-
sional on teievision and radio ." (p. 41). 
Finally; a study by Busby (1979) surveyed the attitudes 
of broadcast station managers on regulations and found that 
the broadcasters, from major and small markets~ believe that: 
Regulations have drastically increased in the last ten 
1 1 
years and with the increase in regulations their jobs 
have become harder and their expenses have greatly in-
creased. They are pessimistic about the future of 
broadcasting and about the future of regulations. 
(p. 340) 
Thus, in conclusion of this section, it appears that 
the American government (and its agencies) do have some r e g-
ulatory and nonregulatory influence over the network's tele-
vision news and there have been cases in the past where the 
government has used this influence. 
4. How has television news performed in its covering 
of past foreign events? Before attempting to find the 
answers to this question, it is significant to note that in 
covering foreign events or crises, some problems exist, not 
necessarily from the fault of television news but from the 
way world politics operate. Some .examples should clear the 
point. 
One such problem, and perhaps an important one, is the 
fact that (international) censorship exists in many parts 
of the world. Some foreign leaders exert pressure on the 
correspondents for favorable coverage. Foreign leaders 
could also limit the reporters' access to sources or ·areas 
of information. A favorable coverage could be obtained by 
foreign leaders' generous gifts to reporters. A somewhat 
militant approach used by a foreign leader is desrcibed by 
Rubin (1975): 
This June (1975), Uganda's president Idi Amin threat-
ened to execute British subject Denis Hills for passages 
critical of Amin in an unpublished manuscript confiscat -
ed by Ugandan police. Amin made a number of demands 
before unconditionally releasing Hills--among others, 
that the British government stop the BBC from spreading 
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"malicious propaganda" against Uganda and the British 
press from publishing "wild and baseless" reports that 
Uganda was in a state of chaos. (p. 55) 
Another problem with covering foreign events (and to a 
oegree domestic events as well) is the fact that there are 
some four billion people in the world and no establishment 
can even think about covering the affairs of this four-
billion population (mainly due to economic ·and man-power 
limitations). A result of this would be missing out on an 
important event that is in the making. This is further ex-
plained by Critchfield (1978): 
Three-fourths of the world's people receive very little 
attention from American reporters. They are the peas-
ants, the three billion. people who are still tradition-
al subsistence cultivators of the land. There should 
be no doubt that these people are worth our attention: 
all the major contemporary revolutions--in Mexico, Rus-
sia, China, Indochina, Egypt, Algeria, Cuba, Angola--
have involved peasant societies. In almost every case 
the revolution was preceded by cultural breakdown out 
in the villages, because the old peasant ways and views 
of life no longer worked. (p. 32) 
The above-mentioned difficulties relating to the cov-
ering of foreign events should be kept in mind while eval-
uating television news performance in covering of those 
events. 
Perhaps the best way to study the foreign coverage 
would be to examine some of the significant foreign events 
and their coverage in the past two decades: 
l. Nigeria and the Civil War (of late 1960's): Sambe 
(1980) studied the American network television coverage of 
the civil war in Nigeria. He found, through a content anal-
ysis, that the three commercial networks used inferences and 
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judgments in covering the crisis. Sambe also found out 
that the networks tended. to be favorable to Biafra's cause 
and unfavorable to Nigeria's. 
Balogun (1973), a Nigerian, feels that the Western 
media fell victim to Biafra's propaganda campaign. He ex-
plains: 
Near-total ignorance of Africa and Nigeria on the part 
of most of the European and American journalists cov-
ering the Nigerian Civil War made them willing to accept 
even ~he most fantastic propaganda handouts at face -
value and precluded any deep analysis of the genesis 
and circumstances of the conflict. (p. 94) 
Balogun further explains why the media were more fav-
arable to Biafra: 
Pressure from powerful financial and economic interests 
which stood to benefit by Nigeria's disintegration 
played a leading role in determining the stand of the 
Western news media. (p. 95) 
Okpaku (1972), presumably an African, is also critical 
of Nigerian coverage and attributes the poor coverage to re-
porters' lack of knowledge and background on Nigeria. He 
suggests: 
It has never occurred to those who run the bastions 
of international communications, such as the Associated 
Press, United Press International, The New York· Times, 
or the television networks, to · employ the services of 
African reporters in order to provide their public with 
more knowledgeable information and more sophisticated 
and more sensitive interpretation of the dynamics of a 
situation the Africans are more aquainted with. (p. 4) 
Finally, Rothmyer (1970) also criticizes the Nigerian 
coverage and believes that "The further away geographically 
the story occurs, the more likely it is that special-inter-
est groups will be successful in influencing its telling" 
(p . 47). 
14 
2. Chile (in the 1960's): Some experts have criti-
cized the media's (including television's) coverage of Chile 
and the American government's involvement in that country. 
Robert Schakne (1976), a CBS correspondent, who covered 
Chile, explains the situation rather clearly: 
The facts were indisputably newsworthy and headline-
making. As the Senate Intelligence Committee report-
ed it, the United States, over a ten-year period, as a 
matter of conscious policy actively interfered in the 
domestic politics of Chile, financing one election cam-
paign, promoting at least one coup d'etat attempt, co-
vertly financing opposition newspapers and political 
parties, overtly and covertly conducting an economic 
warfare campaign to "destabilize" a constitutional 
government, and "laying the seeds", as a C. I .A. official 
put it, for the successful coup d'etat that finally did 
take place ... but for all its news value, this was a 
story that went largely unreported, in print or on the 
air, while the events in question were taking place. 
This was a story left untold until C.I.A. officials 
confessed their role to a congressional committee and 
Representative Michael Harrington, in turn, made that 
testimony public; by then it was testimony about a fait 
accompli, a year after the Allende government had been 
overthrown. (p. 60) 
Morris, Mueller and Jelin (1974) also are critiqal or· 
Chilean coverage by television (and other media). They ex-
plain what was missing from the coverage: 
Among the important missing perspectives in the .cover-
age of Chile was the extraordinary record of what the 
United States Government was doing to the Allende re-
gime~ The assumption of Washington'~ official toler-
ance was an early and persistent theme in the journal-
ism on Chile. Most often the subject of American pal-
ley was simply ignored. · (p. 21) 
Morris et al. further suggest: 
And in much of the coverage there was a one-sided 
characterization of Allen~e and his government that 
obscured both developments in Chile and the reality 
of U.S policy toward that country. The reporting of 
Allende's Chile leaves disturbing questions about the 
depth and range of foreign news coverage, about working 
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re ~ationship s of correspondents to the U.S government ~ 
and, not least, about the imp a ct of culture a n d i deo l-
ogy on the efforts of a free press to .report inte r-
national affairs. (p. 16) 
3. Vietnam War (of late 1960's and early 1970's): The 
coverage of the Vietnam War has brought criticism to te l e-
vi s ion and other media as well. It has been argued that t h e 
media either missed the real story, as they did in Chile, or 
c hose not to tell it. Reel (1979) explains how: 
The networks boast that they brought the Vietnam War 
i nto our living rooms, but there is reason to believe 
t hat what they brought was largely a fiction. What 
we saw was what Michael Arlen describes as a "parade 
of film clips of guns firing and of smoke rising and 
of refugees fleeing", a collection of images that 
smacked of thoughtlessness. Over a period of ten long 
years, television failed to tell us the major story 
of our times, the truth behind the tragic venture into 
Southeast Asia and all that it might portend for our 
count r y . ( p . 1 0 2 ) 
Friendly (1970-1971), former president of CBS News, 
feels that television and o t her media did not succeed in ex-
plaining the Vie tnam War. He suggests that "Brilliant combat 
reporting has not been enough, or Vietnam would not continue 
to be the best reported and least understood war in history" 
(p. 19). 
Bailey (1976) examined the coverage of the Vietnam War 
and found that: 
The network anchormen, in their daily summaries of the 
war, read short stories of events with~ut much inter-
pretation, certainly without challenging, adversary 
interpretation. (p. 323) 
In summary then, a review of expert analysis on tele-
vision news coverage of some of the most important events o f 
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recent history (the Nigerian Civil War, the Chilean affa ir, 
and the Vietnam War) indicates that television and other 
media were not wholly successful in telling the real stories. 
5. Has television news been objective in the past? 
The question of objectivity or unbiased reporting is a very 
controversial one. Experts have presented opposing view-
points in this regard. This is perhaps due· to the fact that 
it is difficult to define the terms in question. One of the 
most recent efforts to define bias was made by Stevenson and 
Greene (1980) who concluded that: 
What news consumers see as biased news is often ma-
terial which is discrepant with the information al-
ready in their heads, material which evokes an evalua-
tive response. If so, news bias is less a function of 
reporters' accuracy or fairness and more a function of 
what readers and viewers think the situation is or 
ought to be. (p. 121) 
It appears that a majority of bias allegations occurs 
when the news organization is covering a story with compet-
ing elements or characters, such as an election, a war, or 
a riot. These are the cases where the media may be charged 
with biased reporting or favoring one side over another. 
For example, Sambe (1980), in an analysis of the tele-
vision news coverage of the Nigerian Civil War, found that 
the three commercial networks were favoring one side (Biafra) 
over the other (Nigeria ) . 
In anot0er case, Efron (1971), in her book The News 
Twisters, studied the coverage of the commercial networks 
during the 1968 presidential electioris. Efron concluded · 
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that the campaign coverage of the three networks was heavily 
biased against Richard Nixon. However, later studies dis-
credited much of Efron's findings and her methodology. 
For example, in a replication of Efron's study, Steven-
son, Eisinger, Feinberg and Kotok (1973) were led to a to-
tally different conclusion: 
There was no evidence of any systematic evaluative bias 
for or against any of the three candidates. Coverage 
of all three candidates· was remarkably similar. 
(p. 219) 
Thus a review of opinions and findings on the issue of 
objectivity indicates that there have been cases where tele-
vision news has been biased, at least to a degree. 
Summary. A brief summary of related research would then 
indicate that: 
1. The American public tends to rely heavily on tele-
vision for news. 
2. Television news has been found capable of influ- · 
encing the public opinion. 
3. The American government has been found capable of 
influencing the television news. 
4. Television news has had some difficulty in cover-
ing some of the most important international events of re-
cent history. 
5. Television news has been found to be biased at 
times, although not necessarily deliberately, in its repor-
ting. 
. . ' 
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Purpose of the Study 
As the review of the literature showed, researdh has 
bee n directed at studying of television news and its effects 
on society. Similarly, research has evaluated the perfor-
mance of television news in covering specific events. Nearly 
all major events covered by television news have been the 
target of one or more scientific inquiries. What follows 
appears to be one of the first scientific attempts to study 
and evaluate network television news coverage of the much-
publicized Iranian hostage crisis (1979-1981). It is the 
purpose of this study to carry out such an evaluation, 
through scientific means, in order to contribute to an un-
derstanding of the performance of the network television 
news. 
Significance of the Study 
Television played a very unique role in the Iranian 
hostage crisis due to several reasons. One, television 
was used for transmission of messages between the governments 
of the United States and Iran since direct communication be-
tween the two governments was made. difficult by severed 
diplomatic relations. Two, the Iranian government tried to 
gain American public support for its cause through American 
mass media, especially television. Three, the American 
government also utilized the mass media to counter such ef-
forts by the Iranian government. Four, the American mass 
media, most notably television, gave an extensive amount of 
coverage to the crisis. 
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Since television played such a significant role in t h e 
crisis, much research is likely to surface in the near fu-
ture, and it will examine how well television covered the 
crisis. What has already surfaced have been judgmental eval-
uations and reactions to the coverage rather than scientific 
inquiries. For example, Said (1980) wrote a lengthy article 
criticizing the media coverage of Iran. His contention is 
that media mainly presented the crisis as the U.S government 
saw it. Thus Said suggests that: 
For a journalist, blindly serving his government is as 
perilous as assuming that his audience is incapable of 
learning. Neither course is acceptable for a society 
like ours, and no amount of going on about free compe-
tition, openness, and democracy ought to obscure the 
issues. Bad journalism is bad journalism, but for the 
U.S it is worse. (p. 33) 
Said further argues that the media were generally 
closed-minded in covering the Iranian crisis. He explains: 
It is alarming that the U.S press seems generally in-
capable of learning much about the world, that its 
reports one day seem not to have incorporated very 
much learned the day before, that it seems generally 
unwilling to refine its perceptions by looking in new 
places. (p. 33) 
Hurewitz (1980), a specialist on the Middle East, 
agrees (with Said), with some "reservations", with the notion 
that "Cove·rage of the late fall and winter 1979-1980 phase 
of the crisis in United States relations with Iran was 
flawed" (p. 19). 
It is important to note that Said is referring to the 
coverage which began with the Iranian revolution (1978-
1979). The author's contention is that the media's misunder-
standing and misrepresentation of the revolution (partly) 
20 
contributed to the (misunderstanding of the) hostage crisis. 
Bordewich (1980) has views similar to Said's: 
We have misunderstood not just the Iranian revolution, 
but revolution itself. We have misunderstood fascism. 
We have misunderstood the implications of moderniza-
tion. In a sense, we have been our own captives in 
Iran, held hostage by our ethnocentrism, the inabi l ity 
to see anything in an alien culture but our own re flec-
tion. (p. 71) 
Hodding Carter, the State Department's spokesman during 
much of the crisis, has the following reservation about the 
Iranian coverage: 
Someday, somebody's going to do a piece on how much of 
policy and coverage was actually based on any kind of 
understanding of the dynamics at play in Iran. I'm 
talking about the critics as well as the policymakers 
and all forms of press. The basic underlying realities 
of what was going on in Iran were ignored. (VanHoffman, 
1980, p. 37) 
Thus it appears that even though no scientific research 
has yet been reported on the coverage of the Iranian hostage 
crisis, some negative reactions have already surfaced. An . 
in-depth scientific a nalysis of the network television news 
coverage of the hostage crisis should then constitute a sig-
nificant step forward in the understanding of television 
news and its performance in reporting developments with sig-
nificant international consequences. 
CHAPTER II 
Methodology 
On e way to evaluate the network's television news cov-
erage of the Iranian hostage crisis would be to determine 
whether the networks reported the event objectively and free 
of bias. To do this, a definition of "bias in the news" 
needs to be utilized. It is, however, apparent that re-
searchers have had difficulty in agre eing on standard def-
initions for bias. For example, Stevenson and Greene (1980) 
note that "Bias is hard to define, but many find it easy to 
recognize in their newspapers and newscasts" (p. 115). 
One fairly common approach defines bias as "The sys-
tematic differen~ial treatment of one candidate, one party) 
one side, of an issue over an extended period of time" 
(Stevenson and Greene, 1980, p. 116). Hofstetter (1976) de-
fined bias as "partiality in the news prograrnrning ... lying, 
distortion, and aggrandizement of values" (p. 4). 
An approach for detecting bias has involved the exam-
ination of the language content of the new~. This approach 
(used by Lowry, 1971; Sambe '· 1980.) fi.rst tries to identify 
the statements that are factual compared to statements that 
are capable of containing bias ·or partiality. It then 
determines whether the statements that are capable of con-
taining partiality are actually biased or not. The re-
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searchers who have used this approach refer to the factual 
statements as "reports" and the statements that are capable 
of being biased are referred to as "inferences" and "judg-
ments". This approach can be applied to all spoken words 
and contends that all sentences (used in the reporting of an 
event), regardless of content, are either reportive or infer-
ential, or judgmental. 
The above approach to the study of news will be applied 
here to evaluate the network's television news coverage of, 
and its attitude toward, the Iranian hostage crisis. The 
justifications for using this approach will be explained 
later. First an in-depth definition for each category (of 
reports, inferences and judgments) is necessary. 
Briefly, report sentences are factual statements made 
from observations; inferences are made when the observer 
infers a conclusion based on what he observes; and judgments 
are those statements that involve some appraisal on the part 
of the observer. Some hypothetical examples should better 
explain the concept. A bystander watches a car weaving as 
it goes down the street. The bystander may comment, "That 
car is not going straight". This would be a reportive 
(factual) statement since the bystander is reporting only 
what he is observing. Or he may comment, "Lodk c;tt that 
drunken drive~'', which would be an inferential statement 
since he is inferring or guessing from the car's irregular · 
movement that the driver is drunk, whereas something else 
might have caused the irregularity. Or the bystander may 
' ' ' 
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comment, "That drunk has no respect for others' rights", 
which would imply that not only is he making an inference 
(that the driver is drunk)~ he is also making a judgment on 
the driver's character. These examples illustrate that an 
individual may observe one occurrence but reach and/or re-
port three different conclusions. At this point an attempt 
will be made to explain reports, inferences. and judgments 
still further. 
Reports are statements made merely based on observa-
tion and are capable of being verified (Hayakawa, 1972). Of 
course some reports may not be easy to verify personally, 
such as the height of a mountain or the depth of an ocean, 
but ideally it is possible to do so. Thus, one may rely on 
available information on the height of the mountain or the 
depth of the ocean with comfort that the information is cor-
rect. Another major characteristic of reports is that they 
can be made only after the observation and not before. 
Inferences are statements made by guessing, from some 
known or observed fact, at some conclusion. Inferences may 
be made at any time, unlike reports, which have to be made 
only after observation. Lee (1962) indicates that, "Any ut-
terance made prior to observation or when observation is not 
possible involves an inference or guess" (p. 34). Haney 
(1973), another author who has distinguished between state-
ments of facts (reports) and statements of inferences, ex- · 
plains that inferences can be made at any time and by any-
one, can go beyond observation and may involve some degree 
'' ' 
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of probability. More recently, Haney (1979) noted that , 
''We find it enticingly easy to make inferences and to utter 
inferential statements with the false assurance that we are 
dea ling with 'facts''' (p. 258). Of course it is signi fi cant 
to note that the point is not to avoid making any inferences 
but rather to try to be aware of the inferences made. It 
would be almost impossible to go through a day of life wi th-
out making some kind of infarence; and inferences can even 
be useful at times. For example, a fire investigator can 
only infer !rom the ruins of a fire as to what caused the 
fire. In a broader sense, science too uses inferences. For 
example, scientists can only infer, from collected data and 
previous observation, the expected nature of the cosmos, as 
direct observation by man has not yet been possible. 
Judgments are statements that contain observers'/report-
ers' personal opinions on, or approval or disapproval of, 
some matter (Hayakawa, 1972). The example of the individual 
who observed the weaving car and said "That drunk has no re-
spect for others' rights" illustrates that the observer shows 
his (approval or) disapproval of the occurrence by letting 
his opinion be known. 
An appropriate summary · foP these three categories would 
be the definitions outlined by Hayakawa (1972), who contends 
that all sentences, regardless of content, fall into one of 
the following groups: 
Reports: Statements of facts, being capable of verifi-
cation, excluding inferences and judgments. 
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Inferences: Statements about the unknown made on the 
basis of the known. 
Judgments: Statements expressing reporters' approval 
or disapproval of the occurrences, persons, or objects being 
described. 
Now the question seems to be how this system of cate-· 
gorization can apply to news reporting. Whenever a report-
er is covering an event (of· any nature), he· uses combina~. 
tions of words to describe what is happening or what has 
happened. These combinations of words (better known as sen-
tences) are then relayed to the audience or reader while 
they contain an impression of the event. There are differ-
ent ways in which the reporter may combine or select his 
words (and thus form his sentences). The type of sentence 
or combination he chooses may be one of three: (a) he may 
report what he has in fact observed which would, according 
to earlier definitions, be a reportive or factual statement; 
(b) he may infer, from what he has seen or what he is seeing, 
a conclusion (that he thinks is factual) which would actually 
be an inference; or (c) he may interject his personal opinion 
into the matter which would constitute a judgment on his 
part. Of course, it is important to realize that the report-
er does not necessarily go through this selection process 
every time; ·and that several factors (including his attitude 
toward the event, his motivation, etc.) influence the way 
he chooses to report. 
Thus, it is appropriate to suggest that the reporter 
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(knowingly or not) has one of three types of sentences to 
cover an event: a report, an inference, or a judgment. This 
is true for any and all kinds of reporters, including news-
paper reporters and broadcast reporters and/or anchormen. 
Since the Iranian hostage crisis was an event covered by 
the reporters, it is appropriate to contend that the report -
ers, as explained earlier, had the above three types of sen-
tences at their disposal, to cover what was going on. And, 
given the five conclusions which were evolved from the re-
view of literature (p. 17), it is appropriate to apply this 
system of categorization (of reports, inferences and judg-
ments) to find out how the networks (through their report-
ers and anchorpersons) covered the Iranian hostage crisis; 
to find out whether the networks merely reported the (ver-
ifiable) facts, or they further inferred from these facts, 
or they plugged in their own opinions and judgments into 
the coverage. As a result, the first research question was 
formulated as follows: 
Were the three commercial television networks more re-
portive in their coverage of the Iranian crisis or more in-
ferential and judgmental? 
As the review of the literature (Chapter 1) showed, 
there have been cases where television news has been biased 
and has taken sides in some past conflicts (for example, 
Sambe, 1980, on the Nigerian C~vil War). Since the Iranian 
hostage crisis put the two governments of the United States 
and Iran into conflict with each other, it is important to 
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find out whether the networks favored either side (the 
United States or Iran) in t heir coverage. In order to do 
this, however, some operational definitions for favorable 
and unfavorable coverage are needed. These definitions 
should be applicable to the crisis under study and should 
have been validated in past research. Such definitions are 
available from Budd, Thorp and Donohew (1967) and have been 
used by other researchers (for example, Sambe, 1980) in 
studies similar to the present one. They are: 
Favorable: Statements that reflect social cohesion, 
cooperation, political and economical stability, and/or 
strength; statements that depict either side as progr~ssive, 
successful, peace-loving, moral, intelligent, lawful, unified, 
and/or exercising leadership. 
Unfavorable: Statements that report social conflicts, 
disorganization, political and economical instability, and/ 
or weakness; statements that depict either side as backward, 
domineering, immoral, impractical, unlawful, disunified, and/ 
or lacking leadership. 
Neutral: Any statement that reflects neither favorable 
nor unfavorable conditions. (p. 53) 
The above definitions will be used to find out if the 
networks favored either side in the Iranian conflict. Of 
course this evaluation is possible only if inferences and 
judgments are detected in the c9verage. This is due to the 
fact that report sentences are, by definition, factual rep-
resentation of events and that if the networks tended to 
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favor one side or the other, this would show in, and be c on-
tained to, their inferences and judgments. Thus, research 
question number two has been designed to discover which side, 
if either, the networks tended to favor in their inferences 
and judgments, if any such inferences and judgments were 
detected: 
Did the three networks favor one side (the United 
States) or the other (Iran) in their coverage of the crisis? 
Finally, since media critics and researchers have 
charged that television news does not identify its news 
sources in most of the cases (for example, Ryan, 1979), a 
third research question was designed to discover what sources 
of news and information the networks used in their coverage 
of the Iranian crisis (this should add support to, or de-
tract support from, previous research): 
What news sources were used most often by the three net-
works in the coverage of the Iranian crisis? 
Procedure 
The procedure employed in this study was similar to the 
content analysis of Lowry (1971) and Sambe (1980). A sample 
of the three commercial networks' (ABC, C~S and NBC) cover-
age of the Iranian crisis in the evening news programs were 
audio-recorded. The sample consisted of three weeks drawn 
at random by selecting one week in April (1980), about five 
months into the crisis, and skipping two weeks and select-
ing another week and so on for the third sample week. The 
sample under study consisted of Monday through Friday (April 
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21-25, May 12-16, and June 2-6 of 1980). Saturdays and Sun-
days were excluded from the study due to the fact that the 
networks use different formats and anchors on the weekends. 
The main sample coverage consisted of a total of fifteen 
days. The selected weeks appear to have been a fair and 
typical representation of the coverage of the crisis due to 
the fact that they consisted of one week of. heavy coverage 
(as was the case in the beginning) and two weeks of moderate 
coverage (which was the case later on in the crisis). 
Only stories and reports relating to the Iranian crisis 
were selected for analysis. Any item read by the anchormen, 
whether a copy story or an introduction to a filmed report, 
was considered to be a story. The stories had to meet one 
or more of the following conditions (established by the re-
searcher for guideline) in order to be selected: 
1. Mentioning the crisis by name. 
2. Mentioning the hostages by name. 
3. Dealing with efforts to free the hostages. 
4. Reporting statements made by officials or private 
citizens regarding the hostages. 
5. Dealing with Iran and/or its internal problems. 
6. Dealing with events caused by the crisis, or the 
events which would not have been covered had the crisis not 
taken place. 
The sample under study was analyzed by three indepen-
dent coders, all American nationals, with ages of 21-25, who 
had an average of two years of college education. The coders 
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listened to each sentence in the selected news stories as 
many times as they wished with no time limitations. 
For research question number one (whether the networks 
were more reportive or more inferential and judgmental), the 
coders were asked to determine whether each sentence was a 
report, an inference, or a judgment. The three coders were 
extensively trained in order to be able to distinguish be-
tween the three categories (of reports, inferences and judg-
ments). As part of their training, the following examples 
(some hypothetical, some taken from the news) were used: 
Reports. (a) The president flew to Camp David last 
night, (b) the senator was reelected for a second term, (c) 
they all had ties on at the reception, (d) she did not at-
tend the congressional hearing, and (e) the congress passed 
the budget bill yesterday. 
Inferences. (a) What they really want to do is to es-
tablish a monopoly, (b) the governor was not smiling because 
of the low turnout, (c) with his ratings so low, he has no 
chance, (d) based on the preliminary results, she will be the 
next president, and (e) his speech last night set the tone 
for his 1984 bid. 
Judgments. (a) This campaign was marvelously organized, 
(b) this has to be the saddest day of his presidency, (c) the 
hurricane devastated the glory of the beach town, (d) the 
exhibition attracted the most sophisticated crowd, and (e) 
her extremely harsh criticism will not go unnoticed. 
The coders were further instructed to observe the fol-
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lowing rules (so that they would not have to make individual 
evaluative decisions that were inconsistent with each other): 
1. All quotations, direct or indirect, are to be code d 
as reports. 
2. If a report sentence contains any element of infer-
ence, it is to be coded as inference. 
3. If a statement contains elements of inference and 
judgment, it is to be coded as a judgment. 
4. All other sentences/statements are to be coded as 
they appear under reports, inferences, or judgments. 
For the second research question, which side, if any, 
the networks favored more, the three coders were instructed 
to decide whether each inferential or judgmental statement, 
if any detected, was favorable to Iran (thus unfavorable to 
the United States), or unfavorable to Iran (thus favorable 
to the United States), or neutral. 
To learn what news sources the three television net-
works used most often (research question number three), the 
following seven types of news sources were identified, and 
each statement was tabulated accordingly: 
1. U~S government: Statements attributed to a U.S 
government official. 
2. Iranian government: Statements attributed to ~n 
Iranian government official or the militants holding the 
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hostages. 1 
3. American public: Statements attributed to a member 
of the American public. 
4. Iranian public: Statements attributed to a membe r 
of the Iranian public. 
5. Networks' confidential: Statements attributed to 
~ 
a network's confidential source. 
6. Unidentified or observed: Statements not attribut-
ed to any source; or the observations made by the reporters 
on the scene. 
7. Others: Statements attributed to any other source 
not covered in the above six. 
This part of the analysis was done by the researcher 
(not the co~ers) due to the fact that it required no eval-
uation or personal judgment. 
1The two groups (Iranian government offic~als and the 
militants) were combined because the Iranian government ap-
parently supported the militants and their position; it was 
also expected that the total for both groups would only make 
up a small percentage of all the news sources (this was ac-
tually supported by the data, Table 3); and, the data later 




A total of 2120 sentences were analyzed. In the fif-
teen days under study, ABC used 704, CBS used 768 and NBC 
used 648 sentences to cover the crisis. These figures in-
dicate that CBS's coverage was slightly longer than that of 
ABC or NBC. NBC, meanwhile, had the least amount of cover-
age on the crisis. At this point the results for the three 
research questions will be examined: 
Research question #1: Were the three commercial tele-
vision networks more reportive in their coverage of the Iran-
ian crisis or more inferential and judgmental? 
The data showed that the three networks used consider-
ably more report sentences than ·inferences and judgments. 
As Table 1, which has the total number of sentences used by 
the networks during the three week sample-period, shows, ABC 
and NBC had almost equal percentages of reports, inferences 
and judgments; whereas · CBS had a slightly higher number of 
reports (by almost 7%) than the other two networks. On the 
whole, the three networks, in the fifteen-day period under 
study, used a total of 1688 (79.6%) reports, 184 (8.7%) in-
ferences, and 248 (11.7%) judgments. It can be noted that 
the difference between CBS and the other two networks was in 
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Table 1 
Reports, Inferences and Judgments 
Networks 
Categories ABC CBS NBC Total 
Reports 544 77.3% 645 84.0% 499 77.0% 1688 79.6% 
Inferences 63 8.9% 62 8.1% 59 9.1% 184 8.7% 
Judgments 97 13.8% 61 7.9% 90 13.9% 248 11.7% 
Total 704 768 648 2120 100.0% 
Note. The numbers are averages from the three coders. 
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the number of judgments used. That is, CBS used fewer judg-
mental statements than ABC or NBC. 
The following are some actual examples, from the re-
cordings which judges/coders unanimously agreed to be re-
ports, inferences, and judgments: 
Reports: 
1. The mother of an American hostage has been allowed 
to see her son. (ABC) 
2. The State Department today sent telegrams to the 
hostage families. (ABC) 
3. A separate statement dealing with Iran called for 
the immediate release of the hostages. (CBS) 
4. Eight men were killed in that failed rescue attempt. 
(CBS) 
5. They spent 45 minutes together, in private. (NBC) 
6. The nine common market foreign ministers, meeting 
in Luxembourg, agreed to impose economic sanctions. (NBC) 
Inferences: 
1. It has long been the intention of Ayatollah Khom-
eini's revolution to humiliate the United States. (ABC) 
2. No further news ... from the compound today. (ABC) 
3. For the time being, the administrat~on decided to 
conceal its disappointment. (CBS) 
4. · Members of congress were just as surprised as 
everyone else. (CBS) 
5. This comes at a time of increasing unrest in Iran. 
(NBC) 
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6. In a land where calm is becoming less common every 
day. (NBC) · 
Judgments: 
1. (Iranian government) which is struggli~g to put 
down a violent rebellion by many of its own people. (ABC) 
2. The campus was torn by violence. (ABC) 
3. Iranian's fragile civilian government clashed to-
day with the powerful clergy in a major test of authority. 
(CBS) 
4. Ramsey Clark was under sharp attack. (CBS) 
5. The Iranians are getting increasingly sensitive 
about violence between Moslem fundamentalists and leftists. 
(NBC) 
6. The audacious attempt to rescue the hostages in 
Iran. (NBC) 
Research question #2: Did the three networks favor 
one side (the United States) or the other (Iran) in their 
coverage of the crisis? 
The data regarding this question are reported in Table 
two, which shows the three-week total for each network as 
averaged from the three coders. 
It is important to note that the data in Table 2 rep-
resent only the inferences and the judgments, not the re-
ports (as expiained earlier). For instance·, Table 2 shows 
that the three networks were neutral in 66.8% of their in-
ferences and judgments. 
Table 2 
Favorable, Unfavorable and Neutral 
Networks 
Categories ABC CBS NBC Total 
Fa 7 4.4% 8 6.6% 14 9.4% 29 6.7% 
ub 40 25.2% 31 25.4% 43 28.9% 114 26.5% 
Nc 112 70.4% 83 68.0% 92 61.7% 287 66.8% 
159 122 149 430 100.0% 
Note. The numbers are averages from the three coders. 
aF: Favorable to Iran/unfavorable to the U.S. 




As shown in Table 2, the three networks tended to be 
mostly neutral whenever they made inferences or judgments. 
In these inferences or judgments, they remained neutral 
66.8% of the time~ while 26.5% of the inferences and judg-
ments were unfavorable to Iran/favorable to the United States 
and 6.7% were favorable to Iran/unfavorable to the U.S. In 
other words, the networks favored one side or the other 33% 
of the time they made any inferences or judgments. 
In comparing the three networks, the data suggest that 
ABC and CBS were slightly more neutral than NBC. · ABC and 
CBS were also almost equally unfavorable toward Iran al-
though CBS, at the same time, used slightly more favorable 
statements on Iran (2.2%). 
Research question #3: What news sources were used most 
often by the three networks in the coverage of the crisis? 
The networks, for the majority of the time (52.7%), 
either did not identify their sources or conveyed what the 
reporters had themselves observed (such as street demon-
strations, funerals, etc.). Table 3 lists the data on the 
origin of the sources for the three-~eek period. 
Further examination of the data shows that all other 
sources were used considerably less than the "unidentified" 
sources. The networks however, used U.S government, as 
their source of information, 19.6% of the time, whereas 
they used the Iranian government only 8% of the time. Another 
comparison shows that the networks used the American public, 
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Table 3 
Sources of News and Information 
Networks 
Sources ABC CBS NBC Total % 
U.S government 114 190 111 415 19.6 
Iranian government 62 63 44 169 8.0 
American public 74 87 100 261 12.3 
Iranian public 1 6 8 15 . 7 
Networks' confidential 42 4 0 46 2.2 
Unidentified/Observed 390 395 333 1118 52.7 
Others 21 23 52 96 4.5 
Total 704 768 648 2120 100.0 
. . ' 
40 
as their source of information~ 12.3% of the time, whereas 
they used the Iranian public .7% of the time. 
The three networks proved to be almost identical in 
their select~on of sources, with the exception of CBS which 
received a greater number of its statements from the U.S 
government. (Sambe, 1980, also found that CBS used mostly 
State Department sources in its coverage of the Nigerian 
Civil War.) 
Statistical Analysis 
In order to measure the reliability of the three coders 
and the degree to which they agreed in their definitions of 
the categories involved, a series of chi-square analyses 
were administered. 
Research question number one asked whether the three 
commercial television networks were more reportive in their 
coverage of the crisis or more inferential and judgmental. 
A chi-square analysis of the data shows that the code~s/ 
judges agreed in their definitions of reports, inferences 
and judgments during each of the three weeks (Table 4). The 
chi-square analysi~ shows that differences among the judges 
in the use of th.e categories do not exceed the .30 level of 
significance . 
Another chi-square analysis of the data (for the three 
weeks total) ori the second research question (whether the 
three networks favored one side . or the other in their cov-
erage) shows a chi-square value of 3.70 with 4 degrees of 
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Table 4 
Chi-square Analysis on Coder Reliability 
Week# Chi-square Degrees of Freedom 
l 4.32a 4 
2 1.61 4 
3 2.53 4 
aP>. 30 (4df)=4.88 
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freedom, (p~.50). Again, the three coders were in suf-
ficient agreement in their definitions of favorable, unfav-
orable, and neutral inferences and judgments. 
No statistical analysis was necessary on the data for 
the third research question (what sources the networks used 
most often) since no judgmental evaluation was made in col-
lecting the data. 
CHAPTER I V 
Summary and Discussion 
Previous research has shown that the three comme r ci a l 
networks have had some diffi culty in covering some of t he 
most important international events of recent history (t he 
Ni gerian Civil War of the late 60's, the Chilean events of 
the 60's, and the Vietnam War of the late 60's and the early 
70's). Research has also shown that the networks, at times, 
have been biased in their news reporting. Thus a content 
analysis was performed to study the network television news 
coverage of the much publici4ed Iranian hostage crisis 
(1979-1981). Three questions were asked: 
1. Were the three television networks more reportive 
in their coverage of the crisis or more inferential and 
judgmental? 
2. Did the networks tend t6 favor one side or the 
other? 
3. What news sources were used most often by the net-
works in their coverage of the crisis? 
A total of fifteen days of evening news coverage (three 
weeks) from the three commercial networks (ABC, CBS and NBC) 
were selected at random. From _these, stories relating to 
the crisis or Iran were further selected and analyzed. 
Three independent coders were instructed to categorize eac h 
44 
news sentence into reports, inferences, or judgments. The 
coders were further instructed to subcategorize inference s 
and judgments into statements favorable to Iran/unfavorable 
to the U.S, unfavorable to Iran/favorable to the U.S, or 
neutral . . The third research question was responded to by 
(the researcher) classifying each sentence as having come 
from one of these sources: U.S government, Iranian govern-
ment, American public, Iranian public, networks' confiden-
tial, unidentified/observed, and finally, others. 
The results showed that the three networks were mostly 
reportive (8~%) in their coverage of the crisis; they did, 
however, use 20% inferences and judgments. The three net-
works were also slightly more favorable to the American 
side (in 26.5% of their inferences and judgments) whereas 
only 6.7% of the inferences and judgments they used favored 
Iran. The three networks, however, remained neutral tn 
66.8% of their inferential or j~dgmental statements. Source 
analyses showed that the networks did not identify their 
sources in 52.7% of the cases. 32% of the statements came 
from U.S officials or citizens compared with 8.7% coming 
from Iranians. A series of chi-square analyses were adminis-
tered and coder reliability proved to be significantly high 
in all cases. 
Discussion 
In order to evaluate the network television news cov-
erage of a significant and recent foreign (international) 
event, namely the Iranian hostage crisis (1979-1981), a sys-
. . , 
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tematic language approach was employed. This approach was 
designed to help determine whether the networks covered the 
crisis objectively (by using factual or reportive sentences) 
or if they injected their own (inferences and) judgments in-
to the coverage. The appropriate contention would be that 
the more reports used, the more objective the coverage is 
likely to be. On the other hand, the more inferences and 
judgments used, the less objective the coverage is likely 
to be. 
The content analysis for research question number one 
(whether the networks were more reportive or more inferen-
tial and judgmental in their coverage of the Iranian crisis) 
showed that the three .commercial networks (ABC, CBS and NBC) 
used mostly report sentences (80%), while using some infer-
ences and judgments as well (20%). This indicates that one 
out of every five sentences used by the networks in cover-
ing the crisis, had some element of inference or judgment 
in it. 
In lieu of the television news coverage of some other 
important foreign events (Chapter 1), one is likely to look 
at the findings in this present study and conclude that tele-
vision did a fairly good job of reporting the Iranian crisis . 
For example, Sambe (1980) used the same language approach 
and studied the television news coverage of the civil war 
in Nigeria. Sambe found far mqre inferences and judgments 
in the Nigerian coverage (53.4%) than this present study 
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found in the Iranian coverage (20%). This establishes a 
significant change (for the better) from the coverage of 
Nigeria to the coverage of Iran. This change could, how-
ever, be partly due to the fact that in this study, all 
quotations (direct or indirect) were coded as reports 
(whether the quotations contained any inferences or judg-
ments or not) and Sambe does not indicate in his article 
whether he did the same with quotations or not. 
The reason all quotations, regardless of content, were 
coded as reports was that this study was trying to examine 
the attitude of the networks and not the attitude of the 
sources of information. If these quotations included any 
inferences or judgments, they were made by the sources and 
not by the networks. And if the networks reported any in-
ferential or judgmental statements made by any sources, the 
networks still reported factually (because that is what the 
sources said and not the networks). 
Thus, other than the above possible reservation, the 
networks used far fewer inferences and judgments in their 
coverage of Iran than they did in their coverage of Nigeria, 
which would mean that, in this context of evaluation, the 
networks did a better job of reporting the Iranian crisis 
than they did in reporting the Nigerian Civil War. 
At this point it is necessary to note that the three 
coders were instructed to dist~nguish report statements 
from inferences and judgments and they were not required to 
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verify the correctness of the reports. The reason being 
that the reports are assumed to be factual (according to 
definition) and verification of reports, if desired, would 
require a different study, perhaps a study utilizing method-
ological approaches of detecting accuracy/inaccuracy in 
reporting. In short, the intention in this study was not 
to check the accuracy of reports, but rather to distingui sh 
reports from inferences and judgments, in terms of wording 
and structure. 
On research question number two (whether the networks 
favored either side in the Iranian crisis), the data suggest 
that the three networks appeared to be mostly neutral in 
their presentation of the events surrounding the Iranian 
crisis even though previous research has found the networks 
to have favored one side or another in some controversial 
issues (Chapter 1). However, on the occasions that the net-
works were not neutral, they were more favorable to the 
United States than to Iran. Perhaps an explanation for this 
is that it would be natural for the American networks to 
tilt to the American side in times of tension or crisis. . . 
Another reason could be the fact that the Iranian crisis 
evolved around the taking of hostages which is largely look-
ed upon as a terrorist act and vexatious at best. Beyond 
the reasons mentioned, it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to speculate on the networks' motivations or intentions. 
It is important to note that this study only examined 
the inferences and judgments in order to find out which side 
. . ' 
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the networks favored more. The report sentences were ex-
cluded from this part of the analysis since the only time 
a report sentence can contain any favorable treatment of 
one side (and not be rated as a judgment) is when the re-
porter makes a quotation (direct or indirect) that is not 
neutral. To evaluate this hypothetical quotation as favor-
able or unfavorable would be again evaluating the source of 
the quotation, and not the networks. As indicated earlier, 
this study did not involve in evaluation of the sources, 
rather it intended to evaluate the networks' performance. 
Evaluation of the sources (and their objectivity) would be 
a more appropriate task for studies concentrating on the 
selection habits of the networks or the news organizations. 
The above reasoning could perhaps explain why Sambe 
(1980) found the networks far more favorable to one side 
(in the case of Nigeria) than this study found (in the case 
of the Iranian crisis). Sambe included the report sentences 
in his analysis of favorable/unfavorable whereas this author 
did not consider it appropriate to make such an inclusion of 
the report sentences into this part of the analysis (for 
reasons explained above). 
Finally, on research question number three (which news 
sources the networks used most often in covering the Iranian 
crisis), the data showed that the networks did not identify 
their sources of information 53% of the time.· This is in 
agreement with previous research. For example, Ryan (1979) 
reported that 61.3% of all the sentences he analyzed were 
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not attributed to a source. It is significant to note in 
this section that the unidentified sources (53%) included 
direct observations b y reporters in this study. Direct ob-
servations would be, for example, covering of ceremonies. 
Obviously, the reporter cannot keep repeating "I see the 
crowd" or "I see the president" or "I see the motorcade". 
It would perhaps be helpful to separate these direct obser-
vations (by reporters) from statements (without any identi-
fied sources) in future research. Finally, some more sug-
gestions follow for future research attempts. 
Future Research 
Future research might study whole newscasts, rather 
than one incident or crisis, to discover how much these 
programs use inferences or judgments on the average and 
overall. That is, instead of analyzing the coverage of 
one event, research could take the whole news and examine 
it across the board. 
Fu~ther, future research might analyze a combination 
of nonverbal and vocal cues (along with verbal cues) in 
order to assess the coverage. A comparison may also be made 
to find out whether verbal and nonverbal signals of a news-
cast are consistent with each other or not. 
Future research might also analyze a sh9rter crisis (in 
terms of time duration) than the Iranian crisis which lasted 
I 
for over a year. This approach . could study the entire cov-
erage of a shorter crisis and thus the need for sampling 
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would be eliminated. 
An attempt may also be made to study 'the crises in 
which (officia~) sources of information are few or inac-
cessible, to find out if this inaccessibility to official 
information would lead to more inferential and judgmental 
reporting. 
Future studies could also analyze crises in which gov-
ernment control (or lack of it) influences or determines the 
flow of information to find out how the news organizations 
cover such crises. Finally, future research may examine 
coverage of the crises in which sources of information are 
hostile to the news media, to find out how reports are af-
fected by such hostility. 
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